We present a model in which a principal delegates the choice of project to an agent with di¤erent preferences. The principal determines the set of projects from which the agent may choose. The principal can verify the characteristics of the project chosen by the agent, but does not know which other projects were available to the agent. We consider situations where the collection of available projects is exogenous to the agent but uncertain, where the agent must invest e¤ort to discover a project, where the principal can pay the agent to choose a desirable project, and where the principal can adopt more complex schemes than simple permission sets.
Introduction
In the main model in this paper we present an analysis of a principal-agent problem in which the principal can in ‡uence the agent's behaviour not by outcome-contingent rewards but by specifying what the agent is, and is not, allowed to do. The agent, whose preferences di¤er from those of the principal, will select from her available projects the permitted project that best serves her interests. The principal can verify whether or not the selected project is indeed within the permitted set, but cannot observe the number or characteristics of the other projects available to the agent.
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An application of our analysis is to an important issue in competition policy, which is the appropriate welfare standard to use when evaluating mergers (or some other form of conduct). The two leading contenders are a total welfare standard, where mergers are evaluated according to whether they decrease the unweighted sum of producer and consumer surplus, and a consumer welfare standard, where mergers detrimental to consumers are blocked. Many economic commentators feel that antitrust policy should aim to maximize total welfare, whereas in many jurisdictions the focus is more on consumer welfare alone. See Farrell and Katz (2006) for an overview of the issues. One purpose of this paper is to examine a particular strategic reason, discussed previously by Lyons (2002) and Fridolfsson (2007) , to depart from the regulator's true welfare standard, which is that a …rm may have a choice of merger possibilities. A less pro…table merger might be better for total welfare, but will not be chosen under a total welfare standard. To illustrate, consider Here, u represents the gain in total pro…t resulting from a particular merger, while v measures the resulting gain (which may be negative) to consumers. Suppose that u and v are veri…able once a merger is proposed to the competition authority. If the regulator follows a total welfare standard, he will permit any merger which lies above the negatively-sloped line in the …gure. Suppose the …rm can choose between the two mergers depicted by N and F on the …gure. With a total welfare standard, the …rm will choose the merger with the higher u payo¤, i.e., the N merger. However, the regulator would prefer the alternative F since that yields higher total welfare.
If the regulator instead imposed a consumer welfare standard, so that only those mergers which lie above the horizontal line v = 0 are permitted, then the …rm will be forced to choose the preferred merger. In this case, a regulator wishing to maximize total welfare is better o¤ if he imposes a consumer welfare standard. As Farrell and Katz (2006, page 17) put it: "if we want to maximize gains in total surplus (northeasterly movements as shown in Figure [ 1]) and …rms always push eastwards, there is something to be said for someone adding a northerly force." Nevertheless, there is a potential cost to adopting a consumer welfare standard: if the N merger turns out to be the only merger possibility then a consumer welfare standard will not permit this even though the merger will improve total welfare. Thus, the choice of welfare standard will depend on the likely number of possible mergers and the distribution of pro…t and consumer surplus gains for a possible merger. 1 Another application of our analysis could be to project choice within an organization. While shareholders wish to choose the available project which yields the highest net present value (NPV), a manager might prefer larger, more capital intensive projects. If the manager sometimes has a choice of project and has the ability to hide her less preferred projects, shareholders may wish to limit the kinds of projects which can be implemented. This question is analyzed by Berkovitch and Israel (2004) , who write [page 241]: " [I] f headquarters cannot observe all available projects, then the manager may manipulate the selection process by presenting projects such that managerial utility is maximized. [...] [W]hile NPV is the best way to measure value added, in many situations, it is not a good way to implement the selection of the 1 Besides administrative …ling fees, merging …rms do not make monetary payments to competition authorities, still less payments contingent on merger approval. Approval is sometimes made conditional upon the implementation of (non-monetary) remedies, such as the sale to third parties of some assets. Our schematic framework would need adaptation to allow for this, although the issue of the appropriate welfare standard nevertheless applies to the questions about merger remedies in that they are designed to ensure that mergers are not likely to be detrimental in terms of the chosen standard.
highest NPV projects."
More generally, our analysis addresses an aspect of the theory of optimal rules: the relationship between the ultimate objective of the rule-setter and the optimal rule to commit to. That relationship is not straightforward inasmuch as the likely consequences of a rule, including for the attainment of the ultimate objective, depend on the responses of agents seeking to maximize, within the rules, their own objectives.
The interplay between rules and the responses that they induce is at the heart of our analysis. Our goal is to characterize optimal rules-which are sometimes strikingly simple-in terms of the fundamentals of our models.
Our benchmark model in section 3 analyzes a setting in which the agent chooses one project from an exogenous, but uncertain, …nite set of available projects. Monetary incentives are ruled out, and the principal optimally restricts agent choice in a way that forbids some projects that are moderately good, in the hope of inducing the agent instead to choose a project that is better for the principal. This bias is akin to putting less weight on the agent's payo¤ than is in the true welfare function.
In section 3 we present three variants of this benchmark model. In section 3.1 we analyze a setting where the agent in ‡uences the likelihood of …nding a project by exerting costly e¤ort. Here, we show that the principal optimally sets a linear permission rule. In addition, to induce greater e¤ort, the principal allows some projects that are detrimental for his interests; this bias is akin to putting more weight on the agent's payo¤ than is in his true welfare function. Second, in section 3.2 we discuss the impact of monetary incentives to choose a good project. When the agent is liquidity constrained, it may be preferable to restrict the agent's freedom to choose projects than to reward her for choosing a good project. Finally, in section 3.3 we consider the possible bene…ts to the principal of using a more complex delegation scheme. For instance, the principal may sometimes do better if he permits a mediocre project to be implemented when the agent reports she has several other mediocre projects available. However, when the number of projects comes from a Poisson distribution, the principal can do no better than to o¤er a simple permission set.
Some other papers have examined situations in which a principal delegates decisionmaking to a (potentially) better-informed agent whose preferences di¤er from those of the principal, and where contingent transfers between principal and agent are ruled out. Aghion and Tirole (1997) show how, depending on information structure and payo¤ alignment, it may be optimal for a principal to delegate full decision-making power to a potentially better-informed agent. The principal's loss of control over project choice can be outweighed by advantages in terms of encouraging the agent's initiative to develop and gather information about projects. In like vein Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1999) , though they deny formal delegation of authority, examine informal delegation through repeated-game relational contracts. Even an informed principal able to observe project payo¤s may refrain from vetoing ones that yield him poor payo¤s in order to promote search incentives for the agent.
Our work is closer to the models which analyze constrained delegation, where the agent can make decisions but only within speci…ed limits and the principal's problem is to decide how much leeway to give the agent. (For instance, a judge sets a convicted criminal's punishment, but only within mandatory minimum and/or maximum limits for the type of crime.) This literature was initiated by Holmstrom (1984) , and the elements of his model go as follows. There is a set of decisions, indexed by a scalar variable d which takes values in some interval D, one of which needs to be made.
Unlike our model where the agent must choose from a …nite set of projects, here any decision is feasible. A given decision generates payo¤s to the two parties which depend on the state of the world, represented by , and only the agent observes this parameter. The preferences of the principal and agent di¤er, and if decision d is made when the state is the principal obtains payo¤ V (d; ) and the agent has payo¤ U (d; ). The principal's problem is to choose a set, say D D, from which the agent is permitted to choose her decision. This permission set is chosen to maximize the principal's expected payo¤ (given his prior on ), given that the agent will make her preferred decision from D given the state . Holmstrom mostly limits attention to cases where the permission set D is an interval. Subject to this assumption (and other regularity conditions), he shows that an agent whose preferences are closer to the principal's will be given wider discretion. (This result has subsequently sometimes been termed the "ally principle".) Following Holmstrom's initial contribution, subsequent papers have analyzed when interval delegation is optimal for the principal, making the additional assumption that is a scalar variable.
3 Melumad and Shibano (1991) were the …rst to calculate optimal permission sets, in the special case where preferences were quadratic and where was uniformly distributed. They found that interval delegation was optimal when principal and agent have ideal policies which are similarly responsive to the state , but that otherwise it could be optimal to have "holes" in D. Martimort and Semenov (2006) …nd a su¢ cient condition on the distribution of for interval delegation to be optimal. Alonso and Matouschek (2008) systematically investigate when interval delegation is optimal, and they generalize Melumad and Shibano's insight that the relative responsiveness of preferred decisions to the state is the key factor for this. They show that when interval delegation is sub-optimal the ally principle need not hold and an agent with preferences more aligned with those of the principal might optimally be given less discretion.
Those models in the Holmstrom tradition di¤er from ours in respect of the actions which are feasible and the form of asymmetric information. In particular, they characterize each decision by a scalar parameter (such as the length of a prison sentence), all decisions are always feasible, and the agent has private information about a payo¤-relevant state of the world. In our model, by contrast, payo¤s of the chosen project to both principal and agent are known, but only a …nite number of projects are feasible (such as the possible mergers for a …rm) and only the agent knows what those possible projects are. Like the papers discussed above, our aim is to characterize the optimal permission set from which the agent can choose, but in a two-dimensional setting where the principal can observe both his own and the agent's payo¤ from the project chosen by the agent. 3 Szalay (2005) presents an interesting variant on this delegation problem in which interval delegation is often sub-optimal. In his model, there is no divergence in preferences between the principal and agent, but the agent incurs a private cost to observe . He shows that it can be optimal for the principal to remove intermediate policies from D so that the agent is forced to choose between relatively extreme options, as this sharpens the agent's incentive to discover .
4 A paper which also investigates a two-dimensional delegation problem is Amador, Werning, and Angeletos (2006) . There, an agent with quasi-hyperbolic preferences has wealth which she consumes over two periods. If there were no uncertainty about her preferences, she would gain by committing to a …xed consumption path at time zero. However, she will receive a utility shock in period 1 and this uncertainty gives a motive to allow some ‡exibility in consumption. Amador et al. …nd a condition which implies that the optimal delegation set simply involves placing a ceiling on …rst-period consumption.
6
A principal ("he") delegates the choice of project to an agent ("she"). There may be several projects for the agent to choose from, although only one can be implemented over the relevant time horizon. A project is fully described by two parameters, u and v. The agent's payo¤ if the type-(u; v) project is implemented is u, while the payo¤ to the principal, who is assumed to be risk-neutral, is v + u. (If no project is implemented, each party obtains payo¤ of zero.) Here, 0 represents the weight the principal places on the agent's interests, and v represents factors speci…c to the principal's interests. The parameter might re ‡ect a true regard for the agent's payo¤ (as in the merger application when pro…ts carry some weight in social welfare), and/or it might re ‡ect a trade-o¤ between allowing the agent wider project choice-and so a greater chance of on-the-job bene…ts u-and paying her a higher (non-contingent) salary. 5 For example, if the principal jointly chooses the permitted set of projects and the salary to meet the participation constraint of a risk-neutral agent, and u is measured in money terms, then the following analysis applies with = 1.
Each project is an independent draw from the same distribution for (u; v). Since without contingent money rewards the agent will never propose a project with a negative payo¤, without loss of generality we suppose that only non-negative u are realized. The marginal density of u 0 is f (u). The conditional density of v given u is denoted g(v; u) and the associated conditional distribution function for v is G(v; u).
Here, v can be positive or negative. Suppose that the support of (u; v) is a rectangle
, where v min 0 v max so that (0; 0) lies in the support of (u; v).
Finally, suppose that both f and g are continuously di¤erentiable and non-zero on the support of (u; v).
In this benchmark model, the number of projects is random and the probability that the agent has exactly n 0 available projects is q n . (Our analysis covers the case where there are surely N projects, but the analysis is no easier for that case.
Indeed, we will see that n being a Poisson variable is the easiest example to analyze.)
Suppose that the project characteristics (u; v) are distributed independently of n. In section 3.3 we discuss an alternative, and sometimes superior, delegation 7 We restrict attention to deterministic policies mainly because it is hard to imagine being able to commit to or implement a stochastic mechanism in practice. It is possible that a stochastic scheme, if feasible, could do better than a deterministic scheme. For example, suppose that = 0, that n = 2 for sure, and that (u; v) = (0:5; 1) with probability 0:5 and (u; v) = (0:9; 0:1) with the same probability. In this case, the optimal deterministic scheme only permits the principal's favoured project, (0:5; 1). However, permitting the project (0:9; 0:1) with probability 0:5 yields the principal a higher expected payo¤ than banning it altogether: in both cases the agent would choose the principal's preferred project if she could, but if that is not available the stochastic scheme would still allow some chance of a desirable project being chosen.
8 Under this assumption, similarly to footnote 2, this delegation approach is equivalent to a mechanism design approach in which the principal commits to a rule that determines which project is chosen as a function of the agent's report of her private information, i.e., the number and characteristics of available projects. To see this, note that the set of projects can be partitioned into two subsets: the set of projects, say D, which, by making suitable reports of other projects, could be chosen for implementation under the principal's decision rule, and those projects which are never implemented by the principal's rule. Faced with this rule, the agent will simply choose her preferred available project (if any) in the former set, and announce any other projects required to implement that choice. Clearly, this mechanism is equivalent to the delegation problem where the agent can directly choose any project in the set D.
9 It is important to emphasize the assumption here, as in delegation problems more generally, scheme which can be used when the principal can cheaply verify a list of projects which the agent reveals to be available.
Given a permission set D, for each u let D u = fv such that (u; v) 2 Dg be the set of type-u projects which are permitted, and let
be the proportion of type-u projects which are permitted. Let
to be the probability that any given project either has agent payo¤ less than u or is not permitted. Note that x(0) is the fraction of project types which are banned, that
x( ) is continuous, and when di¤erentiable its derivative is
(Since x( ) is weakly increasing it is di¤erentiable almost everywhere.) If there are n available projects, the probability that each project is either banned or generates agent payo¤ less than u is (x(u)) n . Summing over n implies that the probability that each available project is either banned or generates agent payo¤ less than u is (x(u)), where
is the probability generating function (PGF) associated with the random variable n. It follows that the density of the agent's preferred permitted project (where this
. Useful properties of PGFs are that they are well-de…ned on the relevant interval 0 x 1 and smooth, convex and increasing over this interval.
The principal's payo¤ with permission set D is therefore
of commitment. (However, see section 3.3 below for discussion about how the principal does not want to renegotiate the permission set in the case where the number of projects follows a Poisson distribution.) Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1999) and Alonso and Matouschek (2007) show how the principal's commitment power can be endogenously generated with repeated interaction (as is the case in the merger context, for instance).
The principal's problem is to maximize expression (2) taking into account the relationship between p and x in (1) and the endpoint constraint x(u max ) = 1. The following lemma shows that the optimal permission set takes a "threshold"form:
Lemma 1 In the optimal policy there exists a threshold rule r( ) such that
Proof. From (1), the function x( ) depends on D only via the "su¢ cient statistic" p(u), not on the particular v-projects which are permitted given u. Therefore, for any candidate function p(u) the principal might as well permit those particular v-projects which maximize the term f g in the (2), subject to the constraint that the proportion of type-u projects is p(u). But the problem of choosing the set D u in order to
is solved by permitting the projects with the highest v so that the proportion of permitted projects is p(u), i.e., that D u = fv such that v r(u)g for some r(u). De…ne V (r; u) to be the expected value of v given that the project has agent payo¤ u and that v is at least r. Recasting (2) in terms of r( ) rather than D, the principal's problem is to choose r( ) to maximize
subject to the "equation of motion"
and the endpoint condition This optimal control problem is solved formally in the appendix, but its solution can be understood intuitively with the following argument. Consider a point (u; r(u)) on the frontier of the permitted set. For the set to be optimal it is necessary that the principal be indi¤erent between his payo¤ [r(u) + u] at that point and his expected payo¤ from the agent's next-best permitted alternative, conditional on the agent's best permitted project being (u; r(u)).
To calculate the latter expected payo¤, note that for a given project the density of payo¤ vector (u; r(u)) is f (u)g(r(u); u). Then the probability that one out of n projects has payo¤s (u; r(u)) and all the others have agent utility no greater
Taking the sum across n, the probability that one project has payo¤s (u; r(u)) and all other permitted projects have utility no greater than z is therefore f (u)g(r(u); u) 0 (x(z)): In particular, the probability that the agent's preferred permitted project is (u; r(u)) is
Conditional on that event, the probability that the next-best permitted alternative for the agent has agent utility no greater than z u is
which has associated density 00 (x(z))x 0 (z)= 0 (x(u)): Therefore the indi¤erence condition required for optimality is
In particular, we see from (6) that r(0) = 0. This implies that the principal does not wish to restrict the desirable projects available to the agent whose best project has only zero payo¤ for her, i.e., there is "no distortion at the bottom". The reason for this is that when u = 0 there is no strategic bene…t to restricting choice. (The strategic e¤ect of raising r(u) above u is to increase the probability that the agent will choose a smaller z, and this e¤ect cannot operate when u = 0.) Di¤erentiating (6) with respect to u and using (4) implies the Euler equation for the principal's problem, which is expression (7) below.
Proposition 1 The principal's problem of maximizing (3) subject to (4) and (5) over all piecewise-continuous threshold functions r( ) has a solution. This solution is di¤erentiable and satis…es the Euler equation
with initial condition r(0) = 0. A su¢ cient condition for a threshold function which satis…es the Euler equation to be a global optimum is that
Proof. The proofs of this and of subsequent Propositions are in the appendix. Expression (7) reveals that in (8) If n is known to be exactly N 1 for sure (so q N = 1), then (x) = x N and
If n is Poisson with mean (so q n = e n n! for n 0) then (x) = e (1 x) and
If n is Binomial (the sum of N Bernoulli variables with success probability a)
then (x) = (1 a(1 x)) N and (x) = a(N 1)=(1 a(1 x)). The "known n"case is a special case of the Binomial with a = 1. The Poisson is a limit case of the Binomial when aN = and a ! 0.
If n is Geometric (so q n = (1 a)a n 1 for n 1 and some parameter a 2 (0; 1))
then (x) = (1 a)x=(1 ax) and (x) = 2a=(1 ax).
Assumption (8), which states that 0 (x) is a log-concave function, is valid for the Binomial distribution-and hence for the "known n"and Poisson sub-cases-but not for the Geometric distribution.
De…ne the "naive" threshold rule to be r naive (u) = u. This is the threshold rule which permits all desirable projects, i.e., those projects such that v + u 0.
This rule might be implemented by a principal who ignored the strategic e¤ect that the agent will only choose the project with the highest u whenever she has a choice.
As such, the naive rule is optimal when the agent never has a choice of project, i.e., when q 0 + q 1 = 1. (In this case 00 0; the right-hand side of (7) vanishes, and so r( ) r naive ( ) is optimal.) Outside this case, though, the right-hand side of (7) is strictly positive. Since r 0 (u) + > 0 and r(0) = 0 it follows that r(u) > r naive (u) when u > 0. Therefore, the principal forbids some strictly desirable projects (and never permits an undesirable project). Moreover, the gap between the optimal and the naive rule, r(u) r naive (u), strictly increases. We state this formally as:
Corollary 1 Suppose the agent sometimes has a choice of project (i.e., q 0 + q 1 < 1).
Then it is optimal for the principal to forbid some strictly desirable projects, and the gap between the optimal threshold rule r(u) and the naive threshold rule r naive (u) widens with u. In particular, when = 0 the optimal threshold rule increases with u.
What is the intuition for why the principal wishes to exclude some desirable projects from the permitted set, whenever the agent sometimes has a choice of project? Suppose the principal initially allows all desirable projects, so that r(u) r naive (u) . If the principal increases r( ) slightly at some u > 0, the direct cost is approximately zero, since the principal then excludes projects about which he is almost indi¤erent (since r(u) + u = 0). But there is a strictly bene…cial strategic e¤ect:
there is some chance that the agent's highest-u project is excluded by the modi…ed permitted set, in which case there is a chance that she chooses another project which is permitted, say with z < u. This alternative project is unlikely to be marginal for the principal, and the principal will expect to get payo¤ V (r(z); z) + z, which is strictly positive when r(z) = z. This argument indicates that it is bene…cial to restrict desirable projects, and not to permit any undesirable projects. Moreover, it is intuitive that the strategic e¤ect is more important for higher u, since it applies over a wider range z < u, and this explains why r(u) r naive (u) increases with u.
We next discuss some comparative statics for this problem.
Proposition 2 Let L and H be two weights placed by the principal on the agent's payo¤, where L < H . Let r i ( ) and x i ( ) solve the Euler equation (7) 
e., the fraction of permitted projects increases with .
Thus we see that the more the principal cares about the utility of the agent, the more discretion-in the sense of a greater fraction of projects being permitted-the agent is given. 10 This result is similar to the "ally principle"in the Holmstrom-type models mentioned in section 1, where the more likely the agent's preferences were to be close to the principal's, the more discretion the agent was given.
A second way in which the ally principle might be expected to be seen concerns the extent of correlation between u and v. Intuitively, when u is positively correlated with v, the agent's incentives are likely to be aligned with those of the principal. In the limit of perfect positive correlation, since the agent's best project is always the principal's best project, it is optimal to give the agent complete freedom to choose a project. (By contrast, with strong negative correlation, the agent's best permitted project is likely to be the principal's worst permitted project, at least when is small.)
However, it is not obvious how formally to de…ne a notion of "more correlation"which could be used as basis for general comparative statics analysis. Instead, in section 2.2 we discuss an example which con…rms this intuition.
It is also intuitive that when the agent is likely to have more projects to choose from, the principal will further constrain the permitted set of projects. With more projects available, the agent is likely to have at least one which lies close to the principal's preferred project. A notion of "more projects" which ensures that this intuition is valid is the familiar monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP). The details are provided in the next result: 
Thus, the fraction of permitted projects falls when the agent is likely to have more projects available.
11 The requirement that the number of projects is ordered by MLRP is a stronger requirement than …rst-order stochastic dominance. Indeed,
there are examples where stochastic dominance leads to a smaller fraction of projects being excluded. 12 Moreover, it is not necessarily the case that the principal bene…ts when the agent has access to more projects. When there is strong negative correlation between u and v, an agent choosing from more projects is likely, all else equal, to choose a worse project from the principal's perspective.
13
11 As emphasized in Lyons (2002) , in the merger application it is more likely that the more stringent consumer standard is superior to a total welfare standard in large, complex economies where merger possibilities may be more plentiful.
12 An example where adding more projects widens the optimal set of permitted projects is the following. Suppose initially the agent has no projects at all with probability 1 " and exactly two projects with probability ". Because the state when no projects materialize plays no role in the determination of r( ), the optimal threshold rule for this agent is just as if there were two projects for sure. Such a threshold rule will strictly exclude some desirable projects. Consider next the situation in which the agent has exactly one more project than the previous situation (i.e., n = 1 with probability 1 " and n = 3 with probability "). Whenever " is small, the state where there is only one project will dominate the choice of r( ), and almost all desirable projects will be permitted, thus widening the set of permitted projects. One can check that this pair of probability distributions does not satisfy MLRP. 13 Our benchmark model assumes that each realization of project characteristics (u; v) is independent across projects. If instead project characteristics were positively correlated across projects, it is plausible that the e¤ect of correlation would be similar to having fewer independent projects. (For instance, in the extreme case where all projects had the same realization of (u; v), the situation is just as if the agent had a single project to choose from, in which case the naive rule is optimal.) acterizing the solution to (7). In the remainder of section 2 we examine further properties of the solution in three special cases.
Independent payo¤s and = 0
Suppose that the distribution of v is independent of u and that = 0. Then the principal does not care about the agent's choice of u, either directly (since = 0) or indirectly since the distribution of his payo¤ v does not depend on u.
Write G(v) and V (r) as functions which do not depend on u. It follows that
which equals zero at the optimum from (7). Therefore, the second-order Euler equation reduces to the …rst-order equation
for some positive constant k.
It follows that the principal obtains the same expected payo¤ with all density functions f ( ) for u. To see this, change variables in (9) from u to F (u). That is to say, writer(F (u)) r(u) andx(F (u)) x(u), so thatr represents the threshold rule expressed in terms of the cumulative fraction of u-projects F . Then (9) becomes
with endpoint conditionsr(0) = 0 andx(1) = 1. Here, the optimal threshold ruler( ) does not depend on the distribution for u, as long as u is continuously distributed.
14 As such, only ordinal rankings of u matter for the principal in this case.
14 Note that this argument requires us to change variables in expression (9), and so F (u) needs to be di¤erentiable and, in particular, the distribution for u has no "atoms". If there were atoms, then we would need to consider what project the agent would choose in the event of a tie, when there were two projects which yielded the same maximal agent payo¤ u.
Exponential distribution for v
Suppose next that v given u is exponentially distributed on [0; 1) with mean (u), so that G(v; u) = 1 e v= (u) . Suppose that = 0. Since V (r; u) r + (u) in this example, the Euler equation (7) is
with initial condition r(0) = 0. Since we wish to compare policies across di¤erent distributions for (u; v), the threshold rule r is not in itself insightful. Rather, we study the fraction of permitted type-u projects, and given r write p(u) = 1 G(r(u); u) = e r(u)= (u) for this fraction. Writing the Euler equation in terms of p rather than r
with initial condition p(0) = 1.
Consider …rst the case where is constant, so that u and v are independent.
Expression (11) implies that p 0 (x) does not vary with u, and it follows that (x(u)) = k 1 F (u) + k 2 for constants k 1 and k 2 . Since (x(u max )) = 1, it follows that k 1 + k 2 = 1.
Since p(0) = 1, it follows that k 1 = 0 (x 0 ), where x 0 = x(0) is the fraction of banned projects at the optimum when u and v are independent. In sum, at the optimum x( )
. Evaluating this at u = 0 implies that the fraction of banned projects is the unique solution to
Next, suppose that u and v are positively correlated in the (strong) sense that (u) increases with u. Write h(u) p(u) 0 (x(u)), which from (11) is an increasing function. It follows that
Since h(0) = 0 (x 0 ), wherex 0 denotes the fraction of banned projects in this case with positive correlation, and h is increasing, it follows that (x 0 ) + 0 (x 0 ) < 1. Since ( ) + 0 ( ) is an increasing function, it follows that the fraction of permitted projects is higher with positive correlation than with independence. A parallel argument establishes that when there is negative correlation, in the sense that decreases with u, the fraction of permitted projects is smaller than with independence. In this exponential example, then, positive correlation between u and v is associated with a greater number of permitted projects than negative correlation.
Poisson distribution for the number of projects
As our third special case suppose that the number of projects follows a Poisson distribution with mean , in which case the Euler equation (7) reduces to a …rst-order di¤erential equation in r(u):
The next result shows that the comparative statics of r( ) with respect to and are stronger than the corresponding results in the general setting reported above in Propositions 2 and 3.
Proposition 4 With a Poisson distribution for the number of available projects, the optimal threshold rule r( ) is pointwise decreasing in and increasing in . (1 r(u)) 2 ; r(0) = 0 :
Note that if = 4 then the solution to (14) is simply the ‡at rule r(u) 0. Thus, in the merger context, if the regulator wishes to maximize total welfare (so = 1), then when the expected number of merger possibilities is = 4 the regulator should optimally enforce a consumer welfare standard.
The solution to (14) when 6 = 4 is given implicitly by
When = 0, expression (15) yields the simple formula
When > 0 expression (15) can be integrated using partial fractions to give 
Variants of the Benchmark Model

Incentives to …nd a project
The benchmark model in section 2 assumed that the number of projects was exogenous to the agent. In such a framework the agent does not need to be given an incentive to discover projects. In this variant we suppose that the agent needs to exert e¤ort to …nd a project. We do this in the simplest possible way, so that by exerting e¤ort e the agent …nds a single project with probability e, while with remaining probability 1 e no project emerges. 15 If she …nds a project, that project's characteristics (u; v) are realized according to the same density functions f and g as in the benchmark model. To achieve success probability e the agent incurs the private cost c(e). Here, c( ) is assumed to be convex, with c(0) = c 0 (0) = 0 and c 0 (1) = 1.
Since the agent's e¤ort incentives depend on her expected payo¤ across all permitted projects, her attitude towards risk is relevant, and in this section we assume the agent is risk neutral. The principal's payo¤ is a weighted sum of the agent's payo¤ (including her cost of e¤ort) and the expected value of v, where the weight on the agent's payo¤ by the principal is . The principal determines a piecewise-continuous function r( ) such that any (u; v) project with v r(u) is permitted.
If she discovers a project, the agent's expected payo¤ excluding e¤ort cost is
and the agent will choose e¤ort e to maximize her net payo¤ eA c(e). Clearly, a reduction in the threshold rule r( ) induces a higher value of A in (18), which in turn leads unambiguously to greater e¤ort from the agent. 16 Since high e¤ort bene…ts the principal as well as the agent, the principal has a reason (beyond the weight placed on the agent's interests) to increase the leeway given to the agent. 15 A richer model would involve the agent being able to a¤ect the expected number of projects, so that the agent may end up with a choice of project. (For instance, if the number of projects follows a Poisson distribution, the agent could choose by incurring cost C( ), say.) The principal's optimal policy in this situation has some similarities to the policy when the number of projects was exogenous: the threshold rule is nonlinear and involves r(0) = 0. However, like the model of costly discovery analyzed in this section, the threshold rule re ‡ects the need to give the agent an incentive to …nd more projects (which typically bene…ts the principal as well as the agent), and it may be optimal ex ante to permit projects which are undesirable ex post.
16 This is akin to the "initiative e¤ect" of delegation in Aghion and Tirole (1997 for the agent's maximum payo¤ given A, then is a convex increasing function and 0 (A) is the agent's choice of e¤ort e given her reward A. The principal chooses r( ) to maximize his expected payo¤
where
The principal's optimal policy is described in the next result:
Proposition 5 The principal's optimal policy takes the form
Thus, the optimal threshold rule is a ray emanating from the origin. This ray is downward sloping and weakly steeper than the principal's naive rule, r naive (u) u.
The only situation in which the principal implements his naive rule is when 00 = 0, which applies when the agent's success probability does not respond to incentives, i.e., there is an exogenous success probability e. Outside this case, though, the principal allows some projects which are strictly undesirable (v + u < 0) in order to stimulate the agent's e¤ort. 17 The more that the agent responds to incentives (in the sense that the function 00 ( )= 0 ( ) is shifted upwards), the more leeway she should have to choose a project. This distortion is the opposite to the bias in the "choosing"model in section 2, where the principal forbade some desirable projects.
Some intuition for the linearity of r(u) comes from the following argument. The principal's payo¤ in (19) is a function of both A (the expected value of v from a single project given that the project is only implemented if it is permitted) and B
(the expected value of u from a project given that the project is only implemented if it is permitted), and A and B are in turn functions of the principal's permission rule r( ). The problem of choosing r( ) to maximize a (nonlinear) function of A and B has the same …rst-order condition as maximizing a linear sum A + B for some constant . That is to say, the solution to the principal's problem is obtained by choosing r( )
for some constant , the solution to which is clearly to set r(u) = u so that only the positive [v + u] are contained in the integral.
In earlier work we analyzed a more complicated version of this problem in which the agent searches sequentially for a satisfactory project, and can in ‡uence the arrival rate of new projects by incurring e¤ort. Then the agent might not implement the …rst permitted project which emerges, but rather wait until she …nds a permitted project which achieves a reservation utility, where this reservation utility will depend on the threshold rule r( ) as well as her discount rate. A linear threshold rule is again optimal for the principal, although not necessarily a rule which starts at the origin. When the principal and agent are more impatient, the threshold rule is shifted downwards, so that the principal is willing to accept a less good project, and with less delay. In the limit of extreme impatience, the dynamic search problem essentially reduces to the framework discussed in this section where the agent tries to discover a single project.
Paying for a good project
Most of our analysis presumes that monetary incentives to choose a desirable project are not available or desirable, for reasons outside the model. In this second variant we brie ‡y discuss the principal's optimal policy when he can condition the agent's payment on her performance. We will see that, even within the con…nes of the model, monetary incentives are not always desirable.
First, suppose that the agent is risk-neutral and is able to bear large losses ex post.
As in most principal-agent models, the principal here is able to attain his …rst-best outcome with the use of monetary incentives. The …rst-best outcome is obtained when (i) he does not restrict the agent's choice of project, (ii) he pays the agent v when a type-(u; v) project is implemented (and allows the agent to keep her bene…t u), and (iii) extracts the agent's entire expected surplus from this scheme in the form of a payment to the principal up front. Such a scheme is akin to "selling the …rm" to the agent, and gives the agent ideal incentives to choose the best available project while leaving the agent with zero expected rent.
Outside this extreme case, however, the …rst-best will not be attainable, and there may again be a role for restricting the agent's discretion. Moreover, the use of monetary incentives will not always be optimal for the principal. 18 To illustrate most simply, consider the situation in which the agent is liquidity constrained in the sense that she must receive a non-negative salary (excluding her payo¤ u from an implemented project) in all outcomes. 19 For simplicity, suppose that there are two possible kinds of project, one of which is preferred by the agent while the other is preferred by the principal. Speci…cally, the "bad project"has payo¤s (u H ; v L ) and the
is indeed socially the good project. The di¤erence u can be interpreted as the "bias" of the agent. Since there are just two types of project, what matters is the probability that the agent has only the good project available (denoted P G ), the probability she has only the bad project (denoted P B ), and the probability she has a choice of project types (denoted P GB ).
If the principal bans the bad project, his payo¤ is
If the principal allows both projects but does not use monetary rewards, his payo¤ is
(Here, the agent will choose the bad project whenever that project is available.) The remaining policy is to give the agent a monetary incentive equal to u to choose the 18 For instance, if there are very many projects available to the agent, the …rst-best is approximately achieved by permitting the agent to choose only the best projects for the principal and making no monetary payments to the agent. 19 A similar restriction to non-negative payments is made in Aghion and Tirole (1997) , Berkovitch and Israel (2004) , and Alonso and Matouschek (2008, section 8.1) .
20 If u L < 0 then without monetary compensation the agent will not reveal the good project, even when that is the only option available to her. In this case, the use of money rewards enables the good project to be implemented when available, which is an important bene…t of using money rewards relative to restricting the agent's choice. good project (and not to fetter her discretion), which entails payo¤
(Here, the agent will implement the good project whenever such a project is available.)
We require 3 maxf 1 ; 2 g in order for monetary incentives to be optimal. Now
These inequalities are jointly satis…ed when the agent's bias u is su¢ ciently small (i.e., when little money needs to be paid to change agent behaviour) or when is close to 1 (so that payments to the agent are not costly for the principal). By contrast, monetary incentives should not be used when the agent's bias u is large or v L is small. Finally, note that increasing the number of projects draws will make it more likely the the agent has a choice of project types, so that P BG rises, and this makes it less likely that 3 > 1 . 21 Thus, all else equal we expect that a greater number of project opportunities, or a larger agent bias, will make the use of money rewards less attractive.
22 Berkovitch and Israel (2004) have analyzed a related model, also with binary project types. Provided the manager's bias is not too large, they show [Proposition 1(a)] that (i) if the "good" (i.e., less capital intensive) project is relatively likely to be available, then the optimal policy is (stochastically) to ban the bad project rather than to be reward the manager when she brings forward a good project, and (ii) if a good project is less likely to emerge it becomes optimal to permit both projects but to pay the agent for a good project.
This example illustrates a more general trade-o¤ between banning mediocre projects and rewarding the choice of good ones. When he bans mediocre projects the principal su¤ers the cost that such projects are not implemented when they are the only ones available. Rewarding the choice of good projects avoids this cost, but instead involves 21 For instance, if there N project opportunities for sure, and each opportunity has probability P of yielding a bad project, then P B = P N , P G = (1 P ) N , and P GB = 1 P N (1 P ) N . 22 See Figure 9 in Alonso and Matouschek (2008) for an illustration in their framework of the limited gains to the principal in being able to make contingent payments to the agent rather than just banning projects. paying the reward whenever at least one good project is available. Restricting choice is therefore preferred when the chance of having only mediocre projects is small, which is more likely to be true when the agent can choose from many projects. 23 In richer settings than the illustrative binary example above, it may be optimal both to ban mediocre projects and reward the choice of good projects. In addition, if the agent is not liquidity constrained, it is possible to …nancially penalize her choice of bad projects, which could well be preferable to an outright ban. We leave a more complete analysis of the interactions between restricting choice and monetary incentives as a topic for further work.
A more complex delegation scheme
Our benchmark scheme simply involves specifying a set of permitted projects, and the agent chooses her preferred available project in this set. In particular, only the agent's chosen project is subject to veri…cation. If however the principal could easily determine the genuine feasibility of all reported projects (so there are no signi…cant costs of auditing reported but unchosen projects), the principal may be able to do better by inducing the agent to list more than one project. Since the listed projects have characteristics which can be veri…ed by the principal, the agent can only reveal true projects. But, except in the implausible case in which the number of available projects is known in advance (the "known n"case), the agent need only report those projects she wishes to report and she cannot be made to reveal the "whole truth".
24
In such cases, the most general (deterministic) delegation scheme takes the following form: if the agent reveals a list of feasible projects, the principal picks (in a predetermined way) one of these projects, or implements no project.
25 23 Another reason why monetary incentives are not always given to an agent is that the agent performs several tasks, and giving incentives to do one task well might induce the agent to underperform on other, unmeasured, aspects of her job (see Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) ). 24 This information structure is akin to games of persuasion. For instance, consider the signalling model of Shin (2003) in which a number of projects are undertaken by a …rm, the sum of whose outcomes determines the returns to shareholders. (Therefore, unlike our framework, the …rm's manager does not choose which project to pursue.) But the manager has interim information about the outcome of a random subset of the projects, and she can reveal a subset of those project outcomes she knows. Thus, the manager can only conceal poor outcomes, not make up good ones. One plausible equilibrium is where the manager reveals all the good news and conceals all bad news. 25 An example of such a scheme concerns work-related travel plans. An employee may be able to get permission for an expensive ‡ight more easily if she reveals a number of other expensive quotes than if she just provides one. As we discuss further below, such a scheme may give the principal some For simplicity, we analyze this issue in the context of the binary project types discussed in the previous section. In this context the most general (deterministic) delegation scheme involves the agent reporting a list of projects as summarized by the pair of integers (b; g), where b is her reported number of bad projects and g her reported number of good projects. The constraint that the agent must tell the truth, but not necessarily the whole truth, is captured by the requirement that the agent's reports satisfy b B and g G, where B and G are the actual numbers of bad and good projects. A delegation scheme in general is a choice function which maps a report (b; g) into a decision to implement (i) either a good project (provided g 1),
(ii) a bad project (provided b 1), or (iii) no project at all. However, the principal need only consider a particular family of delegation schemes:
Lemma 2 We next calculate the optimal choice for m. Suppose a given project has probability P of being bad, and the PGF for the number of project draws is ( ). Then the number of bad projects has PGF (1 P + P x). 27 Therefore, the probability there are exactly n bad projects is P n n! [n] (1 P ) ;
where [n] is the nth derivative of . 28 The probability there are exactly n bad projects and no good projects is q n P n = P n n!
[n] (0), and so the probability there are exactly n bad projects and at least one good project is
follows that the principal's expected payo¤ with threshold m 1, denoted W m , is
To understand this expression, note that when the agent has fewer than m bad projects and at least one good project, she has no choice but to implement a good 26 Green and La¤ont (1986) analyze in general terms a principal-agent model where the agent's feasible reports depend on her private information. Our set-up in which the agent can conceal but not fabricate projects is a special case of their model, and one which satis…es their "nested range condition". Therefore, we can invoke their Proposition 1 to deduce that the principal can restrict attention to choice rules which induce the agent to report all her projects (in contrast to the rules in Lemma 2). 27 In general, if m is a discrete random variable with PGF M , then the random variable generated by the sum of n independent realizations of m, where n is itself a discrete random variable with PGF N , has PGF N ( X ( )).
28 Recall that for an arbitrary PGF (x), the probability of having realization n is equal to the coe¢ cient of x n in , i.e., is equal to [n] (0)=n!.
project, which accounts for the …rst sum above, whereas if she has at least m bad projects she will implement a bad project, yielding the second sum above.
Note that W m+1 W m has the sign of
and so W m is single-peaked in m provided that [m] (0)= [m] (1 P ) weakly increases with m, which in turn holds whenever (21) is negative. To illustrate, consider the case where the number of projects follows a Binomial distribution, i.e., the sum of N Bernoulli variables with success probability a, so that (x) = (1 a(1 x)) N . Then for m N expression (21) becomes
which is indeed decreasing in m, and so the optimal m is the smallest m which makes the expression negative. 29 Notice that the optimal scheme is more permissive-in the sense that m is smaller-when is larger and when N is smaller, which parallels the comparative statics for the benchmark model in Propositions 2 and 3.
What about cases with an unbounded number of potential projects? When the number of projects comes from a Poisson distribution with mean , expression (21)
which is independent of m. Thus, W m is monotonically increasing in m if the above expression is positive, in which case a blanket ban on bad projects is optimal. Alternatively, W m decreases with m if the above expression is negative, in which case the agent should have authority to implement any project she chooses. In either event, in the Poisson case the more complicated delegation schemes considered in this section cannot improve on a simple scheme in which the agent is just presented with a set of permitted projects. 29 For instance, if
The intuition for this result comes from noting that in the Poisson case the number of good projects and the number of bad projects are themselves independent
Poisson random variables (with respective means (1 P ) and P ). Thus, even if the principal could costlessly observe the number of bad projects, the realized number of bad projects has no impact on his decision about whether or not to permit bad projects. Since the complicated schemes in this section are a costly way to gain information about the number of bad projects (since the agent then sometimes implements a bad project when she has a good project), any such scheme must strictly underperform relative to the best simple scheme. This has the additional implication that in the Poisson case the principal's optimal rule-say, to ban the bad project-is "renegotiation proof", in the following sense: even if the agent can credibly reveal a number of projects which are not permitted, the principal has no incentive to adjust his permission set.
Conclusions
Proceeding from the motivating example of welfare standards in merger policy, we have explored the nature of optimal discretion for a principal to give to an agent when the agent may have a choice of project. The principal's problem is to design the optimal set of permitted projects without knowing which projects are available to the agent, though being able to verify the characteristics of the project chosen by the agent. In other words, the problem is to set the optimal rule that the agent must obey, in circumstances where the principal can just check whether or not the rule has been met.
In the benchmark model the agent has a number (unknown to the principal) of projects to choose from. The optimal permission set excludes some projects that are desirable for the principal because the loss from excluding marginally desirable projects is outweighed by the expected gain from thereby inducing the choice of better projects. We showed (i) the principal permits more types of project when he puts more weight on the agent's welfare, and (ii) the principal permits fewer types of project when the agent has more projects to choose from.
In one variant of this model, we supposed that by incurring a private cost the agent makes it more likely that a project emerges, and the optimal permission set was characterised by a linear relationship between the payo¤s of principal and agent.
In order to encourage agent initiative, the principal permits some projects which are undesirable ex post, in contrast to the bias induced in the benchmark model. In a second variant, the principal was able to o¤er a monetary reward to the agent for choosing a good project, but with liquidity constraints on the agent it might nevertheless be preferable to ban mediocre projects than to reward good ones: the former policy has costs when all available projects are mediocre, while the latter involves payments whenever there is at least one good project. In a …nal variant, we consider a situation in which the principal can verify a list of reported projects.
In some cases, the principal does better by using a more complex delegation scheme which, for instance, is more permissive towards mediocre projects when the agent she has several such projects. When the number of projects comes from a Poisson distribution, however, there is no gain in …ne-tuning schemes in this manner.
It would be useful to examine more systematically than we do here the relative bene…ts of o¤ering …nancial inducements (including penalties as well as rewards) to choose good projects versus banning mediocre projects. Another way to develop the analysis could be to multi-agent settings: it is after all a feature of many rules that they apply without discrimination to various agents in various situations. Although this is already a well-posed optimal control problem, it is more convenient to consider s(u) (x(u)), rather than x(u), as the state variable. In this case the equation of motion (4) becomes
APPENDIX
where ( ) is the function derived from ( ) such that 0 (x) ( (x)) for all 0 x 1. (That is to say, (s) 0 ( 1 (s)).) Note that is an increasing function, and it is weakly concave in s if and only if 00 (x)= 0 (x) 0 ( (x)) weakly decreases with x.
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In sum, we wish to maximize
subject to the endpoint condition s(u max ) = 1 and equation of motion (22). We proceed in three stages: (i) we show that an optimal solution exists; (ii) we derive necessary conditions for the optimal policy, and (iii) subject to a regularity condition we show that a policy satisfying the necessary conditions is a globally optimal policy.
First, that an solution to problem (23) exists can be deduced from the FilippovCesari Theorem (for instance, see Seierstad and Sydsaeter, 1987 , chapter 2, Theorem 8). The only non-trivial requirement for this theorem to be invoked is that the set r(u) maximizes (V (r; u) + u (u))(1 G(r; u)) for v min r v max (24) 30 For instance, in the Poisson case (s) = s, and if there are two projects for sure then (s) = 2 p s. In general, (1) is equal to the expected number of projects. 31 Strictly speaking, the Filippov-Cesari Theorem shows the existence of a optimal measurable control r(u) rather than a piecewise-continuous control. However, in practice this is not an important limitation. (See Seierstad and Sydsaeter, 1987, chapter 2, footnote 9.) and except at points where r is discontinuous 0 (s) = (V (r(u); u) + u (u))(1 G(r(u); u))f (u) 0 (s) :
Note that (24) implies r(u) + u (u) = 0 ;
and so (u) represents the gap between the optimal rule r(u) and the naive rule r naive (u) = u. Since is continuous, it follows that r is itself continuous. Moreover, since r( ) is continuous it follows from the Maximum Principle that ( ) is everywhere di¤erentiable, in which case (26) implies that r( ) is itself everywhere di¤erentiable.
Since (0) = 0 it follows that r(0) = 0. Combining (25) and (26) yields r 0 (u) + = (V (r(u); u) r(u))(1 G(r(u); u))f (u) 0 (s(u)) ;
which is equation (7) in the text.
Finally, we discuss when a policy satisfying these necessary conditions is a global optimum. The Arrow su¢ ciency theorem (see Seierstad and Sydsaeter, 1987, chapter 2, Theorem 5) shows that the necessary conditions pick out a global optimum if 
Here, the equality follows from (7), the …rst inequality follows since we assume that Since W 0 (0) must equal zero for all ( ), it follows that r( ) must satisfy (20).
